

## C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. 1383-B (1) to (42), inclusive.

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODO, Nagaharu hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Assistant, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached, being IPS Document 1383-B (1) to (42), inclusive, each described as follows:

- 1383-B (1), consisting of 8 pages in original Japanese, entitled: "Economic Policy which should be taken in connection with Diplomacy Towards U.S.A.", dated March 3, 1940.
- 1383-B (2), consisting of 4 pages in original Japanese, entitled: "An Instruction to Ambassador NOMURA from Minister MATSUOKA," Handed on Jan. 22, 1941.
- 1383-B (3), consisting of 4 pages in original Japanese, entitled: "Telegram to Ambassador NOMURA from Foreign Minister MATSUOKA," on Feb. 7, 1941.
- 1383-B (4), consisting of 6 pages in original Japanese, being Telegram from Ambassador NOMURA to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA dated Washington March 8, 1941, being No. 136.
- 1383-B (5), consisting of 5 pages in original Japanese, being Code telegram from Ambassador NOMURA to Foreign Minister KONOYE April 15, 1941, No. 230.
- 1383-B (6), consisting of 8 pages in original Japanese, being Oral Statement Foreign Minister of Japan, Strictly Confidential May 3, 1941.
- 1383-B (7), consisting of 4 pages in original Japanese, being Telegram to NOMURA from MATSUOKA May 3, 1941.
- 1383-B (8), consisting of 7 pages in original Japanese, being Secret information towards the German and Italian governments concerning a plan of arranging the relation between Japan and America, May 4, 1941.
- 1383-B (9), consisting of 2 pages in original Japanese, being Telegram Top Secret, and Confidential, May 3, 1941, No. 185.
- 1383-B (10), consisting of 3 pages in original Japanese, being Telegram 373 dated May 5, 1941, to Ambassador OGHIMURA from MATSUOKA.
- 1383-B (11), consisting of 9 pages in original Japanese, being Telegram to NOMURA dated May 12, 1941, understanding between the two nations. (Draft.)
- 1383-B (12), consisting of 18 pages, part Japanese and part English, being Telegram dated May 13, 1941, NOMURA to MATSUOKA.
- 1383-B (13), consisting of 4 pages in original Japanese, being Telegram from MATSUOKA to NOMURA, dated May 14, 1941, No. 224.
- 1383-B (14), consisting of 8 pages in original Japanese, being Telegram MATSUOKA to NOMURA, May 15, 1941, No. 230.

- 1383-B (15), consisting of 3 pages, in original Japanese, being Telegram NOMURA to MATSUOKA, dated May 15, 1941, No. 310.
- 1383-B (16), consisting of 5 pages in original Japanese, being gist of instructions of the German Government dated May 17, 1941.
- 1383-B (17), consisting of 2 pages in original Japanese, being Telegram to MATSUOKA from SHIGEMITSU, 19 May 1941, No. 367.
- 1383-B (18), consisting of 24 pages in original Japanese, being Telegram OGILLYE to MATSUOKA, 20 May 1941, No. 567.
- 1383-B (19), consisting of 5 pages in original Japanese, being Summary of Development, Negotiations with Nippon-American Understanding Plan, dated May 20, 1941.
- 1383-B (20), consisting of 1 page in original Japanese, being Telegram 575 from OGILLYE to Foreign Minister, dated May 21, 1941.
- 1383-B (21), consisting of 4 pages in original Japanese, being Conversation of the Foreign Minister published in the Morning Post of 31 May 1941.
- 1383-B (22), consisting of 1 page in original Japanese, being Telegram NOMURA to MATSUOKA, No. 371, dated June 6, 1941.
- 1383-B (23), consisting of 7 pages in original Japanese, being Telegram dated June 8, 1941, from NOMURA to MATSUOKA.
- 1383-B (24), consisting of 2 pages in original Japanese, being Telegram NOMURA to MATSUOKA, No. 384, dated June 9, 1941.
- 1383-B (25), consisting of 15 pages in part Japanese and part English, Telegram dated June 9, 1941, MATSUOKA from NOMURA, No. 378.
- 1383-B (26), consisting of 3 pages, original Japanese, Telegram dated June 9, 1941, NOMURA to MATSUOKA, No. 379.
- 1383-B (27), consisting of 7 pages in original Japanese, Telegram 280-1, NOMURA to MATSUOKA, dated June 10, 1941.
- 1383-B (28), consisting of 2 pages, original Japanese, Telegram 380-3-2, NOMURA to MATSUOKA, dated June 10, 1941.
- 1383-B (29), consisting of 2 pages, original Japanese, Telegram 405, dated June 17, 1941, NOMURA to MATSUOKA.
- 1383-B (30), consisting of 18 pages, original Japanese, Telegram 234, dated April 17, 1941, NOMURA to KONOYE.
- 1383-B (31), consisting of 15 pages, original Japanese, Chief Amendments on the Japanese Draft by U. S. A.
- 1383-B (32), consisting of 9 pages, original Japanese, Draft of Understanding Between the two countries.
- 1383-B (33), consisting of 17 pages, original Japanese, Oral Statement of Mr. Hull, June 21, 1941.

- 1383-B (34), consisting of 9 pages, original Japanese, Counter Draft of the United States, conveyed through Japanese Ambassador June 22, 1941.
- 1383-B (35), consisting of 2 pages, original Japanese, Statement Secretary of State to Japanese Ambassador.
- 1383-B (36), consisting of 3 pages, original Japanese, Statement of Japanese Ambassador to Secretary Hall.
- 1383-B (37), consisting of 2 pages, original Japanese, Telegram No. 425 Ambassador NOMURA to MATSUOKA, dated June 23, 1941.
- 1383-B (38), consisting of 10 pages, original Japanese, Telegram No. 424, from NOMURA to MATSUOKA, June 23, 1941.
- 1383-B (39), consisting of 5 pages original Japanese, Telegram 425, dated June 23, 1941, NOMURA to MATSUOKA.
- 1383-B (40), consisting of 15 pages, original Japanese, American Counter Proposal for Settlement.
- 1383-B (41), consisting of 7 pages, original Japanese, Telegram No. \_\_\_\_ dated June 29 1941, NOMURA to MATSUOKA.
- 1383-B (42), consisting of 23 pages, original Japanese, Japanese Amendment to draft, dated July 15, 1941.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this  
11th day of Oct. 1946.

Nagaharu Oda /s/  
Signature of Official

SEL

WITNESS: T. Sato /s/

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, John A. Curtis, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above-described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
11 day of October, 1946.

/s/ J. A. Curtis 2d Lt.  
NAME

WITNESS: K. Allen

Investigator  
OFFICIAL C.P.CITY

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page 1

Top Secret

Economic Policy which should be taken in connection with  
Diplomacy towards U. S. A.

March 3, 1940

- I. Ever since the outbreak of the Incident, the attitude of the U. S. has been to maintain the body of the Nine-Power Treaty and basing her Far East policies upon it, and to absolutely repudiate the establishment of the New Order in East Asia. Taking advantage of the abolition of the Commercial and Navigation Treaty, the high-handed attitude of the U. S. seems to be getting stronger. Recently America laid a "moral embargo" on aviation-oil refining machine, aluminum and molybdenum. The drafts of laws (for example, the PITTMAN proposal) regarding the embargo of war materials for Japan, which was under discussion in the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, was reported to be temporarily postponed. We cannot say when it will be discussed again. On the other hand, we cannot ignore the movement of "moral embargo" against Japan among civilian organizations. According to future situations, the above-mentioned draft of embargo law may be passed, or perhaps moral embargo measures may be carried out.
- II. The internal reason why the Japanese Government could not assume a resolute attitude against America was due to the intense reliance of Japan upon America for acquiring resources necessary for carrying out the divine war.

The American pressure against Japan, however, will become heavier as long as she realizes the reliance of Japan upon her. By taking advantage of the absence of a treaty, America will probably intensify the pressure by gradually broadening the scope of the embargo or perhaps by showing "gestures" of broadening the scope of embargo on all resources necessary for prosecuting the divine war. As long as Japan doesn't get away from the economic reliance upon America, the insincere determination of Japan against America has no positive effect. Therefore, the most urgent measure which Japan should take is the policy of establishing an economic system not threatened by the attitude of the U. S., by eliminating the extreme reliance upon America as at present. There is no doubt that the establishment of such a system itself, has a great effect in making America reconsider the matter.

III. In case the U. S. imposes a moral or legal embargo of the materials which Japan imports from the U. S., Japan will feel the greatest need of scrap iron, petroleum (especially aviation gasoline), electrical copper, molybdenum, vanadium and machine tools. In regards to these materials, we will do our utmost to plan the elimination of reliance upon the U. S. as soon as possible and take the measures listed in the following paragraphs. Although our country imports a great deal of raw cotton from America, America will not dare to forbid the export of it by considering the situation of the American farmers. Even if the embargo is carried out, we will not feel too much difficulty because we will be increasing the amount of purchase of raw cotton from Brazil, Peru, Iran, etc.

1. Scrap Iron.

Concerning manufacturing of iron, we will endeavor to perfect at all costs the method of manufacturing iron from ore so as to be independent from scrap iron (annual amount about 2,000,000 tons) imported from America at present. We will manage to supply our demand with about 1,000,000 tons of domestic product and scrap iron imported from the Straits Settlements, India, Australia, China, etc. (about 300,000 tons can be imported). Note: When America lays embargo, it is hard to import scrap iron by way of a third power. Therefore, we should not expect upon such temporizing measures.

2. Petroleum.

Concerning petroleum, we shall plan on one hand to import it from a third power besides America, and, on the other hand, we will make a plan and carry it out to make rapid expansion in the production of artificial petroleum by reexamining fundamentally the plan of production expansion of artificial petroleum.

Concerning the amount of imported petroleum, we can almost secure the present amount by so negotiating with third powers such as "Mexico," "Arabia," "Iran," "Venezuela," "Netherlands Indies," "Rumania," etc.

The only problem is the "gasoline" for aviation (crude and refined oil) for which we have been exclusively dependent on America. Concerning this matter, we will accomplish refinery plants of "gasoline" for aviation and study method which enables us to refine "gasoline" for aviation from any kind of crude oil, by devoting all wisdom of science of Japan to it, and at the same time, we will plan to import crude oil of high quality from "Venezuela" and others.

### 3. Electrolytic Copper.

At present about half of the domestic demands for electrolytic copper is imported from America, and the other half is supplied by domestic production, but, judging from the attitude of Canada, it is almost impossible to import the amount now imported from America from Canada. Therefore, we shall produce electrolytic copper by expanding largely the equipments of manufacturing the copper in Japan, and by importing a large amount of copper ore from Peru, Chile, etc., and for this purpose, we must consider the expansion of electric power and ships.

### 4. Molybdeum and Vanadium.

These two are necessary for manufacturing 'special steel', but we shall eagerly study to change the method of manufacturing special steel to "tungsten basis" and try to largely decrease demands for "molybdeum" and "vanadium" by using "tungsten" produced in Korea and South China.

5. Concerning machine tools, we have been dependent on America and Germany, but at present, when we cannot expect much of Germany, the amount dependent on America will be increased more and more, but taking it into consideration that America will not export them to us in the near future, we must make up our mind to do without America and take measures to gratify internal demands by improving and expanding domestic production.

6. Any other materials than scrap iron, petroleum, electrolytic copper, "molybdeum", "vanadium" and machine tools that may be subject to "embargo". Therefore, regarding the materials highly dependent upon America some suitable measures must be taken by following the examples from (1) to (5).

IV. It is easily imagined that in order to carry out No.3 which is mentioned above, a great deal of funds (material) is necessary. And so the fund is to be worked out by turning military funds temporarily. Materially speaking, the rationalization of the fund for the China Incident must be considered, and at the same time, the "Expansion Plan for military equipments against the Soviets" must be contented, for the time being, with the equipments not regrettable for the defense against the Soviets. All the fund and material thus spared should exclusively be spent to expand production so as to get rid of the economic condition now dependent on America. Furthermore, the present 'production expansion plan' must fundamentally be revised according to the aforesaid purport. "Real expansion of production is the mother of consolidation of military equipments." Accordingly, it is clear that, by waiting patiently for several years according to the aforesaid principle, the Expansion Plan of the military equipments will be carried out much easier.

- V. In order to carry out the above-mentioned policy thoroughly, it is necessary to synthesize and consolidate the organism of 'internal economic control.' Fundamentally speaking, it is all the more necessary to turn the motive of enterprise from the pursuit of profit to the welfare of our nation. Outside our country we should try to consolidate more the intimate relationship between Japan, Manchukuo and China, and at the same time to perfect measures to bring the southern countries in our economic sphere. As for the temporary adjustment of the relation with the Soviets, we have to make much more effort to promote it.
- VI. The reason why the Far Eastern Policy of the "Roosevelt regime" is supported by the public opinion of America is that the diplomacy of his regime is attaining or carrying out what is intended by America without danger of involving her in a war, and as long as Japan does not get rid of such economic dependence upon America as at present, it is necessarily sure that such a policy as that of "Roosevelt regime" will be preponderant. But if Japan earnestly tries to find out measures to get rid of the economic dependence upon America, especially the dependence of those resources which are now the object of embargo towards Japan, we shall no longer be threatened by the embargo of America towards Japan. We will strive to secure such situation as to give us firm resolution towards America, and when we are able to hold a resolution and the counter-measure to say that the legal or moral embargo against Japan can be taken as the declaration against Japan, not only the business men who have had dealings with Japan but also isolationists and learned people will, for the first time, recognize that such a diplomatic policy as of "Roosevelt regime" may lead America to war, and those will increase people one after another who hope for "avoidance of war" rather than "isolation of invader." Then the embargo of munition towards Japan will be dissolved entirely by being opposed by the public opinion.

秘

対米外交と閣議シテ採ルべき經濟政策

(皇紀二六〇・三三)

一、事変発生以來米國ハ終始九國條約体制、維持ヲ極東政策ノ根幹トシ帝國、東亞新秩序建設ヲ全面的ニ否認スルノ態度ヲ執リ表リタル如通商航海條約廢棄ヲ契機トシ米國ノ高圧的態度假ニ層強化、徴アリ即チ最近ニ至リ航空用油精制衣機械並ニアルミニウムモリブデンニ對スル道義的禁輸、舉ニ出テ又上院外交委員會ニ於テ審議中ナリシ對日軍需品輸出禁止ノ目的トスル法案(例ハ「ロビットマ」案)ハ一時審議延期ヲ見タル日報セラレ居ルカ何時又審議開始ノ運ナルヤモ知リス他面民間團體ノ對日道義的禁輸運動モ亦輕視スヘカラス今後情勢如何ニヨリテハ或ハ右ノ如キ禁輸案、通過又ハ道義的禁輸措置、実施ヲ見ルヤ天國ラレサル趨勢アリ

二、右ノ如キ米國ノ挑戰的態假ニ對シ從來帝國政府力斷乎タル態假ヲ以テ反駁シ得サリシ國內的要因ハ聖戰遂行ニ必要ナル物資獲得ノタメ強交ニ米國ニ依存シ居リタルタメナリ。然ルニ米國ハ帝國、對米依存關係ヲ知悉シ居ル限、無條約狀態ヲ利用シ聖戰遂行ニ必要ナル個々ノ物資ニ漸次禁輸ノ範圍ヲ拡大シ又ハ拡大セントノ企スナク、ヲ示シツツ對日重圧ヲ加重シ米ニハ帝國ノ經濟的對米依存狀態ヲ脱却セサル限、單ニ口先ニミテ對米強硬決意ヲ表明スルモ其、迫力極メ乏シキヲ以テ此際

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No. 1

我國トシテハ現状、如キ高交、対米依存關係ヲ一日元  
速カニ解消シ米國ノ態度ニ影響カサシサル經濟体制ヲ  
樹立スル方策ニ邁進スルコトヲ以テ最モ急務トス右、如キ  
態交ヲ採用スルコト自体カ米國ヲシテ反省セシムル上ニ  
效果アルヘキハ疑フ容レサル所ナルヘシ

三、我カ國カ米國ヨリ輸入シ居ル物資中、米國カ道義的  
又ハ合法的禁輸ヲ爲シタル際ニ困難ヲ感スヘキ物資  
ノ主要ナルモノハ屑鐵、石油（特ニ航空用ガソリン）電氣銅、  
「モリブデン」、「バナヂウム」及工作機械等ナルカ此等ニ対  
シテハ一日元早ク対米依存狀態、脱却ヲ計ル爲全力  
ヲ擧ケテ在ノ措置ヲ講ズルモノトス尚我カ國、米國  
ヨリ多量、棉花ヲ輸入シ居ルモノ之ニ付テハ先カ米國  
農民ノ立場ヲ考慮シ到底禁輸ヲ爲シ得サルヘク  
假ニ禁輸ヲスルモノ我國トシテハ「ブラジル」、「ペルー」、「エク  
ワドール」等、棉花買付ヲ増額スルコトニ依リ在程ノ困難ヲ感セ  
サルヘシ

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(一) 屑鉄

製鉄業ニ関シ万難ヲ廢シテ鑛石法設備、充實ニ努力シ現在米國ヨリ輸入ス居ル屑鉄(年額約二百萬噸程度)ヲ全ク當ニセス國內生産、約百萬噸並ニ海峽植民地、印度、濠洲、支那等ニヨリ輸入シ得ヘキ屑鉄(約三十萬噸程度可能ナルヘシ)ヲ以テ間ニ合セ得ルカ如ク措置スルモノトス

備考、米國カ「エムバーゴ」ヲ行ヒタル際其ノ屑鉄ヲ第三國經由ニテ入午スルコトハ實際問題トシテ極メテ困難ナルヲ以テ寧ロ斯カル姑息ナル手段ニハ多ク期待セサルモノトス

(二) 石油

石油ニ関シテハ一方ニ於テ米國以外、第三國ヨリ輸入ルコトヲ計ルト共ニ他方ニ於テ人造石油ニ関スル現在、生産力擴充計畫ヲ根本的ニ再檢討シ人造石油、飛躍的増産計畫ヲ立案實行スヘキモノトス

輸入石油、數量ニ付テハ米國ヨリ、輸入杜絶スルモ第三國ニ對スル工作如何ニ依リテハ「メキシコ」、「アラビヤ」、「イラン」、「グエネズエラ」、蘭領印度、羅馬尼等ヨリ輸入スルコトニ依リ從來、輸入數量程度ハ一應確保シ得ヘシ唯問題トナルハ從來專ラ米國ニ依存シ居リタル航空用ガソリン(原油及精製油)ナルカニ関シテハ「グエネズエラ」其他ノ良質原油、輸入ヲ計ルト共ニ速カニ航空ガソリン精製設備ヲ完成ニ當テカ國科學ノ全智ヲ傾ケテ原油、種類ヲ問ハステ航空ガソリンノ精製ヲ可能ナラシムル方法ヲ研究スヘキモノトス

10.3

1383B(1)

(三) 電気銅

電気銅ハ現在國內需要、約半分ヲ米國ヨリ輸入シ残リ、  
半分ハ大體國內生産ヲ以テ賄ヒ居ル處米國ヨリ輸入、分ヲ  
加奈陀等ニ振リ替フルコトモ現在ノ加奈陀ノ態度ニ徴シ先ツ  
不可能ナルヲ以テ國內、電気銅製造設備ヲ大擴張シ秘露  
及智利等ヨリ多量ノ銅鑛ヲ輸入シテ之ヲ以テ電気銅ヲ製  
造スルコトトスヘク此レカ爲ニハ電力ノ擴充及充分ナル配船ヲ考  
慮スルノ要アリ

(四) モリブデン、及「バナヂウム」

右ハ何レモ特殊鋼ノ製造ニ必要ナル處然レ國特殊鋼ノ製法  
ヲ「タンクステンベニシス」ニ改ムコトヲ銳意研究シ朝鮮及南  
支那生産ノ「タンクステン」ヲ用ヒルコトニ依リ「モリブデン」及  
「バナヂウム」ノ需要ヲ激減セシムル様努力スルモノトス

(五) 工作機械ニ付テハ從來米國及獨逸ニ依存シ居リ獨逸ヨリ、

輸入ニ大ナル期待ヲ持チ得サル今日ニ於テハ米國ニ對スル依存  
量益々増大スル次第ナルカ之ニ對シテハ米國ト云フモノカ無  
クナルモノト覺悟シ極力國內生産ヲ改良増産シテ同ニ合ス様  
措置スルモノトス

(六) 屑鐵、石油、電気銅、モリブデン、「バナヂウム」及工作機  
械以外ノ物資ニシテ「エムバーゴ」ノ危険アリ且對米依存  
關係高度ノモノハ凡テ右(一)乃至(五)ニ準シテ適當ナル措置ヲ  
講スルモノトス

20.4

1383B(11)

No. 5

四 前記三ノ措置ヲ實行スル爲ニハ多額ノ資金(資材)ヲ必要ト  
 スヘキハ容易ニ豫想セラルル老朽右資金(資材)ハ主トシテ軍事費  
 ノ一時的大轉換ニ依リ之ヲ捻出スルコトトシ具体的ニハ支那事  
 變ニ於ケル軍事行動ノ合理化ヲ計ルト共ニ現在ノ劉蘇軍備  
 擴充計畫等ヲ身分ノ同守備ニ遺憾ナキ程度ヲ以テ満足ス  
 ルコトト爲スノ他テ此等ニ依リ節約セラルヘキ資金(資材)ヲ  
 舉テテ悉ク對米依存經濟狀態脫却ノ爲ノ生産力擴充  
 ノ爲ニ使用スヘキモノトシ更ニ現行生産力擴充計畫ハ右趣旨  
 ニ依リ根本的ニ改訂セラルルノ要アリ「生産力ノ眞ノ擴充ハ軍  
 備充實ノ爲メ」ナルヲ以テ右方針ニ依リテ數年同隱忍セハ  
 結局ハ軍備ノ充實計畫モ著シク容易トナルヘキコトハ明白ナリ。

1383B(1)

No. 6

五、上述の方策を更に徹底せむ力あり、内ニ於テハ、国内経済統  
制ヲ層有机的ニ綜合強化シ、更ニ根本的ニ利潤本位ノ企業精神ヲ國  
家本位ノ企業精神ニ向上せしむルヲ必要トシ、外ニ於テハ日滿支ノ緊密  
ナル關係ヲ強化シ、同時ニ南洋諸國ヲ我方ノ經濟圈ニ取込ム爲メ施  
策ヲ充實シ、且ニ蘇聯トハ一時的國交調整ヲ進捗せしむルコトニ一段ノ努  
力ヲ拂フコト肝要ナリ

六、目下ハ、ルーズヴェルト政権ノ極東政策ヲ米國輿論一般ノ支持ヲ受ケ、  
ソアルハ、ルーズヴェルト政権ノ外交力何等米國ヲ戰爭ニ捲込ム危險ナク米國  
ノ企圖スルトコロヲ達成セシメ居ルタメナル處帝國ニテ現状ノ如  
キ對米依存經濟ヲ脱却セサル限ハ將來ト雖モル政権ノ如キ  
政策力ノ優勢ナルヘキハ必然ナルヘシ然ルニ若シ帝國於テ眞劍  
ニ對米依存經濟脱却特ニ不取敢目下對日輸出禁止ノ對象トナリ、  
物資ノ對米依存脱却ノタメノ方途ヲ講究シ、最早米國ノ對日禁輸  
措置ニ一応受スルヲ止メ、毅然タル態度ヲ以テ之ニ臨ミ得ルカ如キ事  
態ヲ速カニ招来スル爲メ努力シ、斯クテ合法的又ハ道義的禁輸措  
置ハ之ヲ對日宣戰ト見做スモノナリトノ決意ト對策トヲ有スルニ  
至ラハ從來本邦ト取引關係アリタル業者ハ固ヨリ米國孤立主義  
者証ニ有識者陣營ハ茲ニ初メテル政権ノ如キ外交政策カ米  
國ヲ戰爭ニ導ク虞アリトノ攻撃ヲ武器ヲ有スルニ至リ  
侵略者ノ隔絶シヨリモ寧ロ戰爭回避ヲ希望スル者續出  
スルニ至ルヘク最早對日軍需品禁輸措置ハ輿論ノ反對ニ  
依リ全ク解消スルニ至ルヘシ

TOP SECRET

A Copy of Instruction Sent  
to Ambassador Nomuro

/Handed to Ambassador NOMURA on January 22nd/

1. Unless Japan is bold enough to make great changes in national policies, it is impossible for her to seek American understanding for maintenance of peace in the Pacific and to cooperate with her for the conquest /T.N. Japanese character here used is either to conquer or subjugate but it must be a mistake of to restore or return, both of which is pronounced identically/ of world peace.

2. If the present situation develops as it is, no one can guarantee that in the end the U.S.A. may join the European War or declare war on Japan.

3. If such a thing would happen the result will be a terrible world war with several times more damage than that of the last world war and perhaps will mean the downfall of modern civilization.

4. If there should be no means of finding direct and mutual understanding and cooperation between Japan and the U.S.A., then Japan has to join hands with countries other than Great Britain and the U.S.A. even though these may feel some threat and pressure. It is merely because we have to prevent them from declaring war on Japan or participating in the European War. This is not only for the self protection of Japan but also for the survival of all human being.

5. Having decided that there was no other alternative left for the defense of our country or to prevent the world war we have decided to contract /T.N. the Japanese character used here for contract is obviously a mistake for it is the character for "to correct". The word to join or to contract has the same pronunciation but a different character/ alliance with Germany and Italy.

/Page 2/

6. Since we joined the alliance we must hereafter conform our foreign policy as a member of the Axis, in the same way as the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of the past years was carried out.

7. If the three powers forming the Alliance regard that a third country, which is prescribed under the third article of the Tripartite Alliance deliver an attack, Japan, as a matter of course, must be faithful to the Alliance.

There can be no room for a doubt on this point. However, when Japan decides on an important matter, it goes without saying that she will deliberate carefully in a Cabinet council.

8. The conduct of the Japanese in China is at present regarded as being illegal, unjust or aggressive, but it is no more than a temporary phenomenon. Japan will finally carry out equal and reciprocal treaties with China. In the not distant future Japan will fulfil her traditional idea of HAKKO ICHIU /T.N. the eight directions or the world under one roof/ laid down since her foundation.

9. The Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere will be built on this great principle, the "HAKKO ICHIU", and my motto is "no conquest, no oppression, and no exploitation". In short our desire is to build a world of international neighbourhood and mutual assistance in Greater East Asia, which will set an example to the whole world.

10. Putting aside such an ideal, and taking up questions of daily affairs, our country /T.N. JAPAN/ is finding it necessary to find a way to settle the problems of both self-supporting and self-sufficiency in Greater East Asia. Are these ideals or desires of Japan unjust and unreasonable, when one considers the position of the U.S.A., dominating as she does the whole Western hemisphere, besides extending her influence over both the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans? Surely the U.S.A. can allow thus much to Japan? What we are thinking about is not exclusion of foreigners. It is well for the U.S.A. to come over and cooperate in the development of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Their fear of losing what they need in the shape of rubber and tin is ridiculous.

Please make the necessary efforts to make the President of the U.S.A., the Secretary of States and other prominent people of the U.S.A. appreciate thoroughly the points mentioned above as well as the remarks I made while talking before the members of the America-Japan Society recently and my Diet speech on foreign policy.

The 16th year of Showa, January 22nd  
/January 22nd, 1939/

His Excellency the Envoy Extra-ordinary and  
Ambassador Plenipotentiary NOMURA

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA

/Note/

The Foreign Minister gave his instruction to the Ambassador when they met just before Nomura's departure, saying that JAPAN has made a definite resolution to stand against the U.S.A. if she enters the war, and this attitude would act as a check for the latter participating in the war. The Ambassador expressed his agreement.

△

# 野村大使宛訓令寫

(二月二十二日野村大使ニ付テ)

by 1008  
Doc. 1383B(2)  
秘極

- 一、我國策ヲ相當思ヒ切リテ變更スルニ非サルニ至ラズ解ヲ付テ以テ  
太平洋ニ和平ヲ確保シ進ニ世界平和克服ノ為提攜策  
動スル事所詮不可能也
- 二、此カモ此儘ニ推移セハ或ハ遂ニ米、歐洲參戰若クハ對日開  
戦ヲ見ルニ至ルナキヲ保シ難シ
- 三、若シ斯カル事トモナラハ真ニ戰慄ス(キ世界戦争トナリ其慘  
禍前大戰ニ幾倍スル或ハ遂ニ現代文明ノ没落トナレハシ
- 四、已ニ日本間直接了解提攜ノ途ナシトセハ英米以外ノ國ト  
聯結協力ヲトヘ之ヲ壓迫脅威ニテモ其對日開戦又ハ歐  
洲參戰ヲ豫防セサル可ラス且獨リ皇國自衛ノ為トナラ  
ス實ニ全人類生存ノ為ナリ
- 五、我國ヲ守ルニモ將又世界大戰ヲ防グニモ最早此途ヲ取ル外  
ナシト断ラレ爲遂ニ日獨伊同盟ヲ訂スルニ至リ
- 六、苟モ右同盟ヲ訂シタル以上我國ノ外交ノ將來ニ同盟ヲ樞軸  
トシテ運用サルニ付恰モ往年日英同盟ニ於ケルカ如シ
- 七、而シテ苟モ三國同盟條約第三條ニ規定セル第三國ニ依リ  
攻撃ヲ受ケルニ至リ三國政府ニ於テ認メタルキハ日本ハ當然  
同盟ニ忠ナルヘシ此點一顧カク疑フ存スヘカラス日本カ重大ナ  
ル決意ヲナスニ付極メテ慎重ニ廟議ヲ遂クヘキ申込モナ  
イ事也
- 八、現在日本ノ支那ニ於ケル行動中動モスルハ不當不正若クハ  
侵略ト見ユルモノアルヘシ雖是一時ノ現象ニシテ我國ノ終  
局ニ於テ必ス日支平等互惠ノ主義ヲ實行シ八紘一宇ト  
シ肇國以來ノ傳統的大理想ヲ如實ニスルノ日アルヘシ

No. 1

Doc. 1383 B2  
秘極

九 大東亞共榮圈樹立亦度ニシテ一統一宇ノ大理想ニ因ルモ、  
ニシテ no conquest, no oppression, no exploitation 予ノ「モットー」  
也。要ハ國隆的隣保互助、天地ヲ先ツ大東亞ニ造出シ以テ世  
界大同ノ範ヲ垂シントスルニ在リ

十 斯カル理想ハ暫ク措キ現實更ニ近ノ問題トシテモ我國ハ大東  
亞圈ニ自給自足ノ道ヲ講スルノ必要ニ迫ラレ居リ  
西半球ニ君臨シ、更ニ大西太平、兩大洋ニ延ビツツアル米國  
ヨリ見テ、右日本ノ理想ハ乃至慾望ヲ不啻ナリト稱シ得ヘキ乎。  
此位、事ハ日本ニ許シテ可ナルニ非サル乎。我國ノ考フル所  
ハ斷ニ排他的ニ非ス米モ來ツテ大東亞圈ノ開發ニ協力ス  
ヘシ、其、要スル「ゴム、錫等、供給ヲ絶タルヘシトスル疑懼、  
如キ笑フニ堪ヘタリ

予、過般日米協會ニ於ケル卓上演說及今般帝國議會ニ  
於ケル外交演說等ニ示シタル所ト併セテ右諸點米大統領  
國務長官始メ米國朝野有力者ニ徹底ヲ期セウシ度  
昭和十六年一月二十二日

松岡外相

野村特命全權大使 閣下

(註)

No. 2

尙野村大使出立ニ先キ同大使ト懇談セル際外相ヨリ米國  
カ參戰スル際ハ日本ハ決然立ツヘシトノ毅然タル態度ヲ持  
スルコト同國參戰防止ノ爲メ策トシテモ取ルベキ所ナリト  
說示シ同大使ハ之ニ同感、意ヲ表シ居リタリ。

Doc. No. 1383B (3)

Page 1

A Copy of Cable RUNNING Number 4492  
Secret Code  
SHOWA 16 /1941/ Feb. 7  
Sent 7 o'clock  
DIRECTOR OF AMERICAN AFFAIRS

Telegram to Ambassador NOMURA, from Foreign  
Minister MATSUOKA on Feb. 7, 1941

No. 68

I have been endeavouring to answer frankly for the interpellation at the Diet regarding our attitude and resolution to request America for reconsideration concerning us, and to explain that our national power has not been so much exhausted and enfeebled. Therefore, I beg you, on your arrival there, to endeavour further to explain thoroughly the following points to the President and the influential men both in and out of office to make them fully understand our real intentions.

1. It is the providential mission given to the two countries Japan and America, to save modern civilization from its crisis and to bring peace and prosperity in the Pacific Area, and it is their duty to cooperate for realizing this mission. Upon this belief, Japan expects the development of the friendship between Japan and America. However, unfortunately, the whole nation of America will purposely not understand the real intention of Japan and not a few misconstrue our actions as a threat to America, but this is a serious and dangerous illusion. Japan has a definite resolution with which she will accomplish the established national policy at the risk of the fortunes of our nation. According to reports, there are some people in America who still are opposed secretly to the Tripartite Pact (of course it is natural that there are such elements or people; for in every country such people are to be found), and overestimate the exhaustion of our national power caused by the prolonged China Incident. They presume that if America assumes a firm attitude, she can easily disunite public opinion in Japan, or can make us submit to her. This is really a ridiculous misunderstanding, and we are afraid that such an estimate might bring some unexpected result.

2. The exhaustion of our national power is true to some extent, but it is not so serious as repeatedly propagated in America. Judging from the characteristics of our nation, they will as usual furiously repel pressure from outside, and so if America checks our way on purpose, our whole nation would strengthen its resolution to carry through our national policy by consolidating our union regardless of all sacrifices. If

America were in the circumstances as Japan is at present, the same result would happen, for the character of the American people resembles that of the Japanese. If the American people will just think this over, as a result they will easily understand our mentality. On the contrary, if Japanese people are treated with sympathy and understanding, they will be very thankful, and will sometimes dare to concede and will compromise in any discussion. This is the characteristic of Japanese people that we wish American people to recall in their minds.

3. There may be none in our country who wishes to wage war against America. If, unfortunately Japan and America come to fight, it will certainly be the American people that will initiate the war positively, for America has never opened a war passively.

4. What will America gain by fighting against Japan? Does America desire to conquer Japan and exterminate the YAMATO race? There may be none in America who cherishes such an idea. Even if some may cherish such a dream, it would be absolutely impossible to realize it. Even if America could make Japan surrender, and enforce a cruel treaty upon the Japanese people, that might be comparable with the Versailles Treaty, Japan would break off such fetters or bonds within thirty years. The restoration of Germany is an example. The constitution of Japan is not matched by that of any other country. Japan has always overcome all national difficulties, by virtue of the unbounded grace of the Emperor. There is no doubt that the restoration of Japan will be wonderfully rapid compared with Germany. The Emperor is indeed the eternal source of our national strength. Without understanding this unparalleled constitution, the Japanese nation can never be understood after all. In fine, the war between Japan and America would bring not only ruin upon the two countries, which should always be on friendly terms, but also the downfall of world civilization. America will gain nothing from the war, and calmly thinking, nothing is more absurd than the commencement of war.

5. If Japan and America were to fight each other, the Soviets would certainly move, and if Japan were completely defeated, as America desires, the Soviets would certainly sweep all over China and at once bolshevize the greater half of the Asiatic continent by taking advantage of the circumstances. Does America welcome such an eventuality? If Japan should submit to America, the situation in East Asia would indeed be terribly confused.

6. The diplomacy of our Empire is based upon the great principle of "the World a Home" /T.N. HAKKO ICHIU/ and what

Japan devotes itself to is the establishment of world-peace and the prosperity, and Japan has never had such an intention as to attack America. And so we cannot understand why America is intent on arming against Japan. Japan and America should never be opposed to each other, but cooperate. But the speeches and moves of the statesmen in America against Japan are not only very stimulating, but also they seem to aim at large armaments sufficient to police the world. Such is not only regrettable for peace in the Pacific area, but also not to be recommended for America. I believe that America should not meddle in the "living sphere" of other powers, but be awakened to her original responsibility or mission towards the peace of the world, and devote herself towards breaking the present world crisis, and should promote the welfare of the people in the spirit of mutual assistance and concession of the world.

441009  
138383

電信室	番 四九二	符 暗	昭和十六年三月七日七時一分發	ミ ア ト リ カ
二月七日	松岡大臣發	野村大使宛電報	昭和十六年三月七日七時一分發	局長

二月七日 松岡大臣發 野村大使宛電報  
中六八号

本大臣會議ニ於ケル質疑等ニ際シテ米側、反省ヲ促ス為メ年直ニ我  
力態度ト決意トヲ表明シ且我國力ノシテ消耗沈衰シ居ラサルコトヲ明  
カニ示シ努力シ居ル處ニ着任ノ上ニ統領初メ朝野有力者ニ對シテ左ノ趣  
旨ヲ可然敷行説明シ我力真意ハ徹底此ノ上ニ努力アリ度ニ  
一現代文明ノ破局ヨリ救ヒ太平洋ニ平和ト繁榮榮トヲ招来スルコトハ日  
米兩國課セラルル天與ノ使命ニシテ之カ實現ノ為ニ協力提携スル其  
ノ責務ナリ日本ハ此ノ信念ニ基キ日米國交ノ打開ヲ希求スル次第ナル  
モノ不意ニシテ米國朝野ハ故ラニ日本ノ真意ヲ了解セシメ又我方行  
動ヲ以テ米國ニ對スル相喝ナリト誤解スル向テ無勢カラサル處有テ重大且  
危険極ニ覺シテ日本ハ國運ヲ賭シテモ既定國策ニ邁進ス  
確固不動決意ヲ有スル次第ナリ從テ米國カ我國民中ニ三國條  
約締結今猶密要論ヲ挾ム分子アリト云フカ如キ情報(無論  
アリ併ニ何レノ國ニモアルヲリ)ニ基キ或ハ又支那ヲ變ノ遷延  
ニ依リ我國力消耗ヲ過大ニ評價シテ米國ニシテ強硬態度ニ出  
シルニ於テハ容易ニ日本ノ國論ヲ介列セシメ若クハ結局我ヲ辟易  
屈伏セシメ得ヘト觀測スルカ如キコトアラハ之亦嗤フヘキ誤解ト  
算スヘキ斯ノ如キ真ニ不測ノ結果ヲ齎スヘキヲ恐レ

二我國力ノ消耗ハ或ル程度ニ至ナルモ米國辺ニ於テ頻リニ宣傳  
ラルルカ如ク斯ノ疲弊ニ居ル誤ニハアラス又我國民ノ性格ヨリ云  
フモ外部ノ壓迫ニ對シテハ猛然反撥スルヲ常トシ從テ米國ニシテ

故愈ニ我ニ<sup>進</sup>路ヲ阻害セシ方我國民ハ朝鮮野蓋々<sup>國</sup>結ヲ強<sup>國</sup>ニシテ  
性ヲ惜メ<sup>國</sup>策ヲ定メ遂ニ期スルノ決意ヲ固ムヘシ假リニ米國ガ日本  
ト同様ノ環境ニ在リトヤバシト莫我國民ニ似通セタル米人ハ必ズ煩ヲリ  
ニ恐ラフ同一結果ヲ生スヘク米國民ハ右ノ心理及之ヨリ生スル結果ヲ  
ヤスク了解スルヘシ他面我國民ハ同情ト理解トヲ以テ臨ムモ、  
二對テハ寧ク之ヲ多ク或場合ニ理論ヲ高シ感情的ニ讓歩ムニ  
モ敢テス特貨ヲ有スルヲ要スルヘカラス米國ノ識者タルモ、ハ煩  
此ノ憂相刻スヘキナリ

三 米國ニ對シテ進ニテ戰爭ヤト考ル者ハ我國ニ合カレシ不幸 日米事ヲ構スル  
如クトナリハハシ 必ズ米國民ヨリ積極的ニ働キカケ内戰スヘシ米國ハ米ヲ  
消費ス多ク身ニテ内戰ニカケル予ナシ

如、米國ハ日本ト戦争シ果テ何ヲ獲トスルヤ日本ヲ征服シ大和民族ヲ  
 絶滅セシムルヲリヤカ、ル考ヲ抱ケル者ハ米國三人ミナルヘシ又左鄰、  
 夢ヲヨミ抱キタリトテソレハ絶対實現不可能ナリ假リニ日本ヲ壓倒ス  
 ンガエザイニ條約ニモ比スヘキ苛酷ナル條約ヲ強ヒタリトスルモ日本ハ  
 恐ラク三十年ヲ出スニテ此桎梏ヲ破ルヘシ殷鑑遠カラズ独逸ノ復興ニ其  
 例ヲ見ヨ日本ハ他國ノ有ヤサル國体ヲ有シ天皇陛下ノ限リナキ内閣  
 威ニ依リ國運殘多ク大難局ヲ突破セリカ、ル日本ノ復興ハ独逸ノ場合  
 ニ比シ遙カニ急速且強固翼的ナリヘキハ疑ヲ容シカル所ニテ皇室ハ  
 實ニ我國民總力永遠ノ源泉ナリ此ノ類例ナキ國体ヲ了解セズニテ  
 ハ到底日本國民ヲ理解シ難シ要之日本衝突ハ元來親善關係ニ在  
 レキ内國カ共ニ破滅スルノミナラス遙ヒテハ世界文明ノ沈落ヲモ齎ス  
 ク米國亦何等獲ル所ナク冷靜ニ考フヘキ實ニ愚ノ骨頂ナリト云フノ  
 也

1383B3

五、日米戦争、ソ聯ハ必ス動クヘシ而シテ假ニ日本カ米國ノ欲スル如ク全  
敗ストヤ、ソ聯ハ必ス全支那ヲ席捲シ之ヲ赤化シ此勢ニ乘リテ忽  
クニテ亞細亞ノ大半ヲ赤化スヘシ米國ハ果シテカハ *eventuality*  
ヲ歡迎スルヤ万一モニ日本ニシテ戻スル如キ事至ル東亞ノ事態ハ實ニ  
戦慄スヘキモノアラシ

六、皇國外交ハ「依」字ノ大理念ヲ基調トシ其、終始專断スル所ニ世  
界ノ平和繁榮ヲ確保スルニ在リ米國ヲ改觀スルカ如キ意圖ハ勿  
論毫毛有ヤス從テ米國カ対日軍備減タタルハ我方、理解者ニ所  
ナリ日米交渉ニ対立スヘキニアラステ協調スヘキナリ然ルニ米國政  
治家最近対日言動ハ甚シク刺戟的ナルノミナラス其目標恰  
モ米國ヲシテ全世界ノ警覺を喚ブタルニ至ラシムル程度ノ大軍  
備ヲ整備セシムヘシト云フニ似タリ斯ノ如キハ當ニ太平洋平  
和ノ爲メニモ悲シムヘキノミナラス米國ノ勢ヲ取ラサル所ニシテ  
米國ヲルモノハ他ノ列強ノ生存圈ニ干渉スルコトナク其  
ノ世界ノ平和ニ対スル本然ノ責務ニ自覺メ互助互讓ノ精神ニ  
依リ現下危局ヲ打開ト人類福祉ノ増進トニ念及スヘキモノナ  
リト信ス